A weedy florilegium

In PDF form: assembling-and-authority.pdf

Are you a Hebrew? Are you one of the first Roman Christians? A Christian lawful to Jewish customs and tradition? Is this your century or theirs? Are these your politics or theirs? Your ethics or theirs? Where does the materialism and piety of your faith end and the true worship of your faith begin?

As for the Christian rites, such as baptism, the Lord’s Supper, festivals, public prayers, and any other observances which are, and always have been, common to all Christendom, if they were instituted by Christ or His Apostles (which is open to doubt), they were instituted as external signs of the universal church, and not as having anything to do with blessedness, or possessing any sanctity in themselves. Therefore, though such ceremonies were not ordained for the sake of upholding a government, they were ordained for the preservation of a society, and accordingly he who lives alone is not bound by them: nay, those who live in a country where the Christian religion is forbidden, are bound to abstain from such rites, and can none the less live in a state of blessedness.
—Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Benedictus de Spinoza; pg. 76

The Judaeo-Christian Scripture says nothing of going to the blocky brick and mortar, putting on a tie, and worshipping this or that many times a week. However, we can take from Scripture that the first Christians met at least once a week. What was their reasoning for meeting at least once a week? Let’s take a stab at it.

2:37 Now when they heard this, they were pricked in their heart, and said unto Peter and to the rest of the apostles, Men and brethren, what shall we do?
2:38 Then Peter said unto them, Repent, and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost.
2:39 For the promise is unto you, and to your children, and to all that are afar off, even as many as the LORD our God shall call.
2:40 And with many other words did he testify and exhort, saying, Save yourselves from this untoward generation.
2:41 Then they that gladly received his word were baptized: and the same day there were added unto them about three thousand souls.
2:42 And they continued stedfastly in the apostles’ doctrine and fellowship¹, and in breaking of bread, and in prayers.
2:43 And fear came upon every soul: and many wonders and signs were done by the apostles.
2:44 And all that believed were together, and had all things common²;
2:45 And sold their possessions and goods, and parted them to all men, as every man had need.
2:46 And they, continuing daily with one accord in the temple, and breaking bread from house to house³, did eat their meat with gladness and singleness of heart,
2:47 Praising God, and having favour with all the people. And the Lord added to the church daily such as should be saved.
—The Acts 2:38-47

The Jews went to synagogue routinely. We’ll concede any argument that Christians were just playing it up like Jews. So all religions do some routine (and traditional) activities? Not our issue right now, aside from it being implicit arguments for universal materialism which all the (superstitiously) religious wish to deny—but like I said, not our issue. So the Christians picked up some habits.

1 If you were given a chance to speak to God directly and ask as many questions as you like, as if to a wise master, would it be morally wrong of God to allow you to run out of questions?

1.1 The assumption is that no one, not even the authors of the Scripture, understands the teaching of God with absolute accuracy.

1.2 The interesting question is this: From where does the attrition to accuracy in a message originate? Is it with the speaker or is it with the listener? Can we even ask if God would be morally right or wrong to let one cease inquiry because of the flaw in human nature? Is it morally wrong for us to not learn how to generate newer and better questions after we’ve attained the knowledge to previous ones, given that God only answers the questions we directly ask? Elementum: There is a relationship between Morality and present Knowledge. What is it? Which precedes, if they are not temporally parallel? That is, can (negative) moral judgments be made against one bearing insufficient knowledge? Must morally right actions follow from sufficient knowledge? Can we even play deductive waltz with concepts such as these? (Are they invalid questions?)

1.21 Back to the original question:

Whence it follows, that if anyone wishes to teach a doctrine to a whole nation (not to speak of the whole human race), and to be understood by all men in every particular, he will seek to support his teaching with experience, and will endeavour to suit his reasonings and the definitions of his doctrines as far as possible to the understanding of the common people, who form the majority of mankind, and he will not set them forth in logical sequence nor adduce the definitions which serve to establish them. Otherwise he writes only for the learned—that is, he will be understood by only a small proportion of the human race.
—Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Benedictus de Spinoza; pg. 77

2 “And all that believed were together, and had all things common”

2.1 When you stand in Church, spinning circles and twirling about, are you absolutely certain those who stand next to you believe in exactly the same idea or conception of God that you believe in?

2.11 Aside from the epistemological can of worms I just opened up, we can take an easy path. No, it’s not exactly the same idea or conception, but it only varies in degree, not kind. Is someone standing next to me, as they sing praise and vomit the rhetoric of the Council of Nicaea, actually believing in the same God I believe in, just in a different flavor?

2.12 However, attend to that thought: Is it possible for someone to be standing next to you who does actually not believe in the same idea or conception of God as you? Can we translate the verb “believe” into a distinguishable action? Is spitting rhetoric what one does when he or she “believes?” How about drinking from a divine cup? Is that “believing” in action?

2.13 The biggest question here is: How do you know? If you do not know, then we have a dilemma. Are you assembling with possible serial killers and soccer moms as an expression of faith in your fellows or in God? Is assembling an expression of faith in man or faith in God? Can it be both?

2.14 I suppose the religious person would answer, “By expressing faith in God, I am therefore safe to do whatever it is I want amongst men without worry.” That’s an easy answer. Anything follows from a contradiction; anything follows from the infinite. This will be discussed later.

2.2 Do you have anything in common with those worshipping with you?

2.21 Can a Jew, a Muslim, and a Christian worship together? What does it mean to have commonality amongst beliefs? Can you argue for “general spirituality” while still maintaining arbitrary worship practises and pagan rituals?

3 There’s no justification for traveling to a “building of worship” from the Scripture. Any location can be a place of assembly. Acts 19:9-10 shows up that synagogues or schools could function as places of worship as well. Anyone demanding that one must “attend church” must justify why church and not one’s own house.

3.1 If the justification is “more people gather there” or anything similar, then one must reconcile “collective faith” with “personal faith.” Does it concern God whether or not you worship in an arbitrary body of common beliefs or amongst your immediate family? Or by yourself in your own kitchen? It seems like the whole slew of potential answers are but mere preferences.

10:24 And let us consider one another to provoke unto love and to good works¹:
10:25 Not forsaking the assembling of ourselves together, as the manner of some is; but exhorting one another: and so much the more, as ye see the day approaching.
—Hebrews 10:24-25

1 If you find that assembling with your family or fellows is stressful (contrasted with promoting you to love and do good works) for you, does the Scripture provide you with a sufficient means to endure that stress beyond merely asserting that you succumb to hierarchical obedience? This would be nonsense, if one answers that it does not while maintaining that one must still submit to Strength. Must children presuppose their parents will follow Scripture accordingly?

And, ye fathers, provoke not your children to wrath: but bring them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord.
—Ephesians 6:4

Or must parents presume their children will follow the Decalogue?

Honour thy father and thy mother: that thy days may be long upon the land which the LORD thy God giveth
—Exodus 20:12

Children typically do not have much say in the matter of how they will be instructed. So clearly the weight of the struggle for a proper, moral upbringing rests primarily on the parent. What’s concerning is the ambiguity in obeying an authority whose power has been legitimized without the child’s consent. How exactly is that authority established; how is it made sovereign? This reminds me of a criticism of question begging made against social contract theory. What is the relationship between material upbringing, sovereignty, honor of one’s parents, and true worship? If you accept the theory of the social contract, as opposed to a Spinozistic theory of capacity to desire as the only foundation of one’s rights, then would be required of individuals involved need be fully conscious and understanding of their relationship under their contract? Can a child be fully conscious and understanding of its binding relationship with a presupposedly legitimized sovereign power? It seems like the social contract is disturbed when it meets the door to the household. Is it disturbed at the state as well? Is the social contract (growing toward sovereignty) compatible with Divine Fiat Systems (automatic/arbitrary sovereignty)?

Scripture tells us that the father derives his status from God itself.

3:14 For this cause I bow my knees unto the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ,
3:15 Of whom the whole family in heaven and earth is named,
—Ephesians 3:14-15

Therefore, the father’s authority is either divine or it is not. This can be said without granting that the father himself is divine, but only the binding contract between, say, a father and his son. The divine quality of authority comes from the causal connection between a God’s decree to the father’s decree and down to the offspring. If you take the father’s decrees to not be divine, then you tacitly argue that God’s fiats are thus not divine. This is a less interesting stance for our case here. So the father’s edicts are divine and sovereign through a non-consensual binding contract. Thus, the child under the father must exercise faith in God through the proxy of the father. This is the understanding implicit in the Decalogue’s commandment to “Honor thy [parents]“.

However, this is clearly absurd. If we, as children of parents, blindly apply this ambiguous and overly simplistic fiat, we preclude the possibility of children refusing abhorrent derivative Christian philosophies such as that of the KKK and other Christian terrorist groups. No, the argument here is not to blame Christianity for the ills of the world. The argument is that it is absurd, being born into this precarious and chaotic situation, some like to describe as “the best possible”, to follow Scripture, written by fallible men, that could not have foreseen the explosion of derivative philosophies which stem from it. The issue is not “Christianity is bad because the KKK is bad.” The issue is: How do I make intelligible the notion of honoring a fallible person? If the answer is: Have faith in the divine chain, then you’ve submitted your defeat to the volatile world which seemingly can easily destroy you.

Concluding Thoughts

Beyond all of what has just been said, we must look at the tone and basis for these recommendations on how to worship. These high priests are not asserting that “in order to worship God [and thus, if you're a Christian, to be moral], you must assemble.” The idea that piety and morality have some sort of relationship is false. Piety does not produce a moral person, and piety is necessarily constrained to superfluous religious practices.

What was Saint Peter’s justification for these practices?—Don’t act superstitious. Peter needed the same sort of reasoning we need today for any sort of act we make. The high priest was merely recommending what he perceived to be the best means of expressing faith amongst the pagan Romans, given what limited intellects they possessed. Furthermore, they needed to appeal to the lesser intellects of their followers. So they submitted simple and general practices to their followers which would be difficult to argue against. In any case, however, these were recommendations to ancient Christians, not authoritative guidelines binding for the rest of eternity. If you are a Christian and you read them as such, you are a Jew. The arbitrary claims of putting on expensive slacks, driving to a building even once a week, and eating kosher foods are but one person’s opinion on how to worship.

For where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them.
—Matthew 18:15

Verses such as this suggest that the only requirement of a proper assembly is that a multitude of persons be gathered in God’s name. Perhaps some trivial questions could be asked of this. What is “God’s name?” Like with my previous epistemological issue, the question is not “Can we all believe in the same idea exactly?” but “As we stand together, can you know if I believe in the same idea in just the same way you believe in it?” In what important ways do ideas differ? Does the configuration, or unique identity, of a mind establish exclusivity between itself and other minds to all concepts, all potentially apprehended ideas? Can we become fully conscious of a mutual acquisition of presupposed common notions?

If we cannot know, then we are expressing a certain faith in man, not God. Why? The intentions of man surreptitiously immoral are of a more immediate concern to your well-being. You do not rally and worship amongst men in strip clubs and at the shopping mall. You need to know if someone is going to harm you. If you deny this (which already has evidence in support of the claim that you do not deny it; you built your own “safe house” of worship), then we have defeatism in the face of man for asinine and blind faith in God, taking the blunt of every ill and hateful action that man can toss your way. You do not live this way: Face it. You are clannish and bigoted; worship at home—worship in yourselves.

Yesterday in my “Proposition 5 of Ethics” entry, I attempted to shed some light on my own understanding of the crucial demonstration of that proposition. In fact, it is so crucial, I form three contentions:

1 that the whole of Spinoza’s demonstration in the Ethics for substance monism depends on the clear and sound exposition of that proposition;

2 that should we take Leibniz’s response to the accusation of his own Spinozism at face value, found in a certain correspondent letter, proposition 5’s proof decisively determines whether or not “He would be right, if there were no Monads.” That is, in Leibniz’s metaphysics, the world is constituted by a infinite quatity of infinitely complex substances called Monads. Their proposition exists as a direct contrast to the possibility of a single infinitely complex substance.

On the contrary, it is precisely by means of the monads that Spinozism is destroyed. For there are as many true substance—as many living mirrors of the Universe, always subsisting, as it were, or concentrated Universes—as there are Monads; whereas, according to Spinoza, there is but one sole substance. He would be right, if there were no Monads.
—Letter to Bourguet, 1714

3 We see that Proposition 5 concerns itself solely with our relation, in so far as our intellect can distinguish between them, to Substance qua substances or Monad qua substances. Fundamentally, Substance and Monad are the same concept; whereas one Substance constitutes Spinoza’s metaphysical outlook, infinitely many Monads (Substances) constitute Leibniz’s metaphysical outlook.

3.1 It seems apparent that the difference between Substance Monism and Monadology is essentially epistemological. That is, regardless of their inconsistent truth values, can we ever know the conclusions of the doctrines per se or even distinguish between them?

In PDF form: misreading-spinoza.pdf

As I was reading through Chapter 14 of The Courtier and the Heretic: Leibniz, Spinoza, and the Fate of God in the Modern World, I noticed and reflected upon a reoccurring notion not only limited to the literature I had before me: that Spinoza is Naturalizing God or Deifying Nature. Leibniz, Spinoza’s immediate colleague and debating partner during the November month of 1676, too, took this to be Spinoza’s aim. The author of The Courtier and the Heretic, Matthew Stewart, flirts with the idea as well. Indeed, it seems to almost every interpretation of Spinoza that I read, this hypothesis stirs up without fail. The general idea Stewart has in mind, as expressed by two explicitly made but not yet expounded upon arguments, is that Spinoza’s aim was chiefly political: Spinoza wished to undermine the orthodox tradition of overarching authority. In my mind, to set out to “disrobe God” or to tack on “divinity” to nature would be largely a political move. From this, the claim is that Spinoza was more so interested in a “transvaluation” of all values more so than demonstrating, however rigorously he could, the true nature of Deus, Sive Natura [God, that is to say, Nature] (I paraphrase Definition 6 of Chapter 1 of the Ethics:),

[that being] absolutely infinite, maintaining an infinity of attributes, each of which expresses its infinite and eternal essence.

More importantly, he says in the subsequent corresponding Explication:

I say absolutely infinite, not infinite in its own kind. If we say [that being] is infinite in its own Kind, then we can prevent certain attributes from pertaining to its True Essence.

Indeed, this seems like a digression into self-gratifying recollection of the master’s idea; but I think it is unjustly overlooked, this crucial definition, when philosophers, dimwits, scientists and charlatans attempt to “pin down” what Spinoza thought of God. They fall prey to their presupposing and imposing interpretation of an [external] doctrine in their own terms. Right by their side, Spinoza joins in the attack against Science or the attack against God. The author of The Courtier and the Heretic joins in, claiming that Spinoza’s understanding of God is best “understood in the negative.” Spinoza is “best” understood by contrasting his doctrines with the standard, the conventional, the orthodox. I feel this argument presupposes a (political) agenda for Spinoza by portraying his system as best understood from the negative. I think Spinoza’s system is best understood in its positive aspects: absolutely infinite, necessity of all things, dogs and men as modes, and all that. It’s tantalizing and difficult work understanding Deus sive Natura, but as Spinoza says “All things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.” Merely because it is understand best by us “in the negative,” this does not sufficiently support the argument that Spinoza had a personal vendetta or political agenda outside of describing to the followers of reason what God’s nature necessarily is. Indeed, Spinoza is just talking about really opaque stuff.

But of course, to the Scientific mind today, Spinoza is “Naturalizing God”, in so far as the Scientific mind debates with the Theologian from Source work; and to the Theologian today, Spinoza is “Deifying Nature”, in so far as the Theologian claws for an attempt to destroy the Scientist’s Spinozistic leaning. It is an incorrect assumption for these intellectual brutes to ever believe that Spinoza’s God’s true essence is ever Nature or God exactly. No, these are but attributes, and an attribute is “what the intellect perceives of a substance.”

We must understand this seemingly forgotten or never truly observed (by our opponents) Definition 6 of the first Chapter of the Ethics. To ask: Is he dirtying up the divine, or is he exalting the dirt? Well, we have a meaningless question, and you have no attended to the arguments or notions of the work correctly. Spinoza is doing neither: He is speaking of God, or Nature proper.

“Deus sive Natura.” Spinoza was called “our Jew” by Leibniz, “that odd [Jew] philosopher”, “apostate Jew”, “the Atheist Jew”, Jew-this, Jew-that. Never have I seem such casual prejudice looming beneath the thoughts of great thinkers as if it were argument itself. Perhaps it is merely a form of referential endearment to consistently take note of his ethnic background. But even today, it seems the most any philosopher can say of Spinoza is either “Who?” or “He was that Jew, right?” What has any of this to do with his works? This seems to be the doorway into [my] argument that Spinoza has gone unduly unnoticed by the population at large. Obscure and esoteric philosophers, marginalized by the Western (analytic) tradition, chant loudly but unheard into the ears of positivists and Wittgensteinians who demand the conformity to Language as the God of Man. We’ve taken the God of old and turned Him into a patriarchal phenomenalistic linguist. And anything Spinoza has to say, in the rigorous Doctor’s mind, is precious or just a silly mode. It must be Nature or it must be God—the embattled theologians and philosopher-scientists continue.

“Deus sive Nature.” Seymour Feldman, editor and writer of the introduction of Samuel Shirley’s translation of the Ethics, treats us to an enlightening explanation of much of the nomenclature Spinoza radically redefines throughout the course of his masterwork. Introduction, Definition 8. Sive or Seu reads:

The orthodox translation of these Latin words is ‘or.’ Spinoza nearly always uses them to indicate an alternative expression for what he is trying to say, and this in fact gives us a valuable insight into the interlocking of concepts that characterises his system. But the English ‘or’ is frequently disjunctive; e.g. you can travel by this road or by that. So the unvarying translation of sive (seu) by ‘or’ can be quite misleading.
I have therefore usually translated it by ‘that is’ when it implies equivalence. When Spinoza uses ‘hoc est,’ which he frequently does, I also translate as ‘that is.’

Now this may seem quite trivial. Spinoza says that through Science you find God or through, say, the Church you find God. These are both just alternative routes to the same end. To stay true to Spinoza’s system, in the words “Deus sive Natura,” we see that both terms are Attributes. They are each one of the infinite Attributes which constitute the essence of God or Nature.

When we think of “traveling this road or that road,” do we find that in going these disjunctive routes we witness the exact same sorts of trivial objects and environments? If I travel down path A, supposedly alternative to path B, do I expect to see the exact same sorts of things I would see as if traveling down path B? Of course not; I have taken a different route. From the perspective of someone, say, a scientist, on path A, even if it is remarkably similar to path B, that scientist will not see exactly that which, say, a theologian sees on path B.

So did Spinoza turn God into a Scientist, or did he turn the world into a soul, a spirit, the divine? Did he naturalize God, or did he deify Nature? The question is a false start.

At the level of language “deus” is a term used to reference either an object or an idea. This is what words do, as no one will contest. For Spinoza, Axiom 6 reads,

A true idea must agree with its object.

Clearly, within the confines of his system, God “agrees with” Nature. In the strictest way, God is Nature in the way that the number 4 written down on a piece of paper agrees with the idea of number four thought in one’s mind. If never written down, the number 4, in so far as whatever potential arithmetical application goes, does not exist. But when it is written down, in so far as whatever potential arithmetical application goes, it does (until it is erased; but even some marks of it still remain). Now, consider of all the number 4s in the world: This would be God, in so far as this crude analogy attempts to illustrate. God is every idea agreeing with every object; that is, as applied as Nature is in so far as it exists, God exists in so far as it [God] agrees with Nature. Take away Nature, take away God.

Back at the language level “deus” references either “God” or it references “Nature”. However, by A6, “deus” references to both. It works not unlike an inclusive OR statement. The same goes for “natura”; this is evident given what has just been demonstrated. Now, when someone says “the Kingdom of God” they either mean the kingdom of God is in God or it is outside of God in so far as God’s power over that kingdom. When we say “deus” we either refer to a transcendental (orthodox) or immanent (Spinozist) God. We could say, when someone passes away, “He is with God now” which would be synonymous with saying “He is in the Kingdom of God now.” The message would be conveyed necessarily with both utterances. From this, as far as the communicated idea goes, the “Kingdom of God” is synonymous with “God” itself. In any event, at least, we can say that both concepts are applicable and thus efficient signifiers for God.

To the point: What is divine? Either “deus” is a referential term for all things divine or it is not. If the former, it must be granted that when someone says a thing is “divine” in the religious sense, they mean it is directly related to God’s divine nature. That is, a divine cup would be divine because it mutually shares the divine nature with God. God may bestow its own nature on the cup, and God may not be on the same ontological level as the cup in so far as it and the cup partake of the divine attribute. But nonetheless, each (God or divine cups) would be described by the word “divine” in so far as they each share divine attributes (supposing one accepts doctrines such as transubstantiation and not nonsensical, figurative symbolic materialism). Therefore, when I take action or an affected by supposed action of divine things, I could say that I was “affected by the divine” or, equally understood, “I was affected by God.”

If the latter, then this would be that there are divine things outside of “deus” or God. This would mean that we could possibly refer to something as divine but its transcendent quality would either come from within it or from some external means. If God is not the source of all divine things, then divine things are either divine because of themselves or because of something else. If the former, then clearly this contradicts Scripture for:

Ex 20:3-4 “You shall have no other gods before me. You shall not make for yourself an idol in the form of anything in heaven above or on the earth beneath or in the waters below.”

Indeed, it seems that God dictates that the possibility of divine things having a source other than God is actually impossible. Therefore, God is the totality of divine things. When we have a divine cup, we could say, “I have a Godly cup” or “I have a cup of God.” It would be the same as saying “I have a divine cup”.

From this, we see that “deus”, “God”, “divinus”, “divine” are all interchangeable referential terms for the same idea which, by A6, must agree with its object. And finally, we must conclude that we Spinoza says “Deus, sive Natura” he does not mean “Judeo-Christian God as the Jews and Christians understand it or Nature”. He in fact means “the totality of divine thing or the totality of natural things”. God or “deus”, in effect, becomes merely a referential term for the totality of divine things, whatever those divine things may be, not a certain conception of “God” as a contrast to Nature.

This proposition is ambiguous and its demonstration difficult to accept; however, it is the basis for demonstration for many subsequent propositions. I believe its demonstration is crucial to the whole of Ethics, but only in so far as one requires strict proof-solutions, or at least the chapter in which it rests. I will here attempt to study it, but we must keep in mind that the rest of the Ethics can still be understood intelligibly and used instructively even if some of its proofs are not valid. Even Bertrand Russell says that the Propositions can be read without drudging through the Demonstrations.

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P5: In Nature there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute.

Demonstration: If there were two or more distinct substances, they would have to be distinguished from one another either by a difference in their attributes, or by a difference in their affections (by P4). If only by a difference in their attributes, then it will be conceded that there is only one of the same attribute. But if by a difference in their affections, then since a substance is prior in nature to its affections (by P1), if the affections are put to one side and [the substance] is considered in itself, that is (by D3 and A6), considered truly, one cannot be conceived to be distinguished from another, that is (by P4), there cannot be many, but only one [of the same nature or attribute], QED.

Antecedents:

D3: By substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, that is, that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed.

A6: A true idea must agree with its object.

P1: A substance is prior in nature to its affections.

P2: Two substances having different attributes have nothing in common with one another. (For my purposes.)

P4: Two or more distinct things are distinguished from one another, either by a difference in the attributes of the substances or by a difference in their affections.

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Thoughts:
1 If two distinct substances exist, upon perceiving those substances (by D4), a distinction between them can only be made through appealing to their Attributes or through their Affections (which are the Modes, or ways, in which an Attribute is itself perceived of the substance; all by P4).
2 If one takes the former approach to distinguish the substances by an Attribute, presupposing that they do in reality bear different Attributes in order to distinguish them, then the substances must be understood as not having the same Attribute. Indeed, from this case, the distinction cannot be made because in order to distinguish the substances through an Attribute, supposing that an attempt at distinguishing presumes that the Attributes are exclusive identities and not the same in nature, they would have to have something in common. But they would not have anything in common (by P2). Therefore, if they have different Attributes, as stated, only one of them can be (”there is only one of the same attribute”). That is, one substance will be the only substance in so far as attempting to perceive its distinction from other substances because its distinction by distinguishing it presupposes that it is already distinct.

Simply: If their Attributes are different, then they cannot be distinguished from one other by those Attributes because their difference is already established in principle (by P2); they have no commonality thus no mutual Attribute.

This seems like it is unhelpful to distinguish them by their Attributes alone. We must look to their affections.

If you want to really impress your professors, use phrases like “metaphysical individualism” in your arguments. Take that ordinary language philosophy.

Meet JavaScript, really.

Threnody Ensemble’s Timbre Hollow (2000)

It’s on my top 10 of all time, for its power, elegance and character are hard to match. This album is an unforgettable, chilling and beautiful edifice of emotion qua music.