Multiplicity of Substances or “Monads”
Yesterday in my “Proposition 5 of Ethics” entry, I attempted to shed some light on my own understanding of the crucial demonstration of that proposition. In fact, it is so crucial, I form three contentions:
1 that the whole of Spinoza’s demonstration in the Ethics for substance monism depends on the clear and sound exposition of that proposition;
2 that should we take Leibniz’s response to the accusation of his own Spinozism at face value, found in a certain correspondent letter, proposition 5’s proof decisively determines whether or not “He would be right, if there were no Monads.” That is, in Leibniz’s metaphysics, the world is constituted by a infinite quatity of infinitely complex substances called Monads. Their proposition exists as a direct contrast to the possibility of a single infinitely complex substance.
On the contrary, it is precisely by means of the monads that Spinozism is destroyed. For there are as many true substance—as many living mirrors of the Universe, always subsisting, as it were, or concentrated Universes—as there are Monads; whereas, according to Spinoza, there is but one sole substance. He would be right, if there were no Monads.
—Letter to Bourguet, 1714
3 We see that Proposition 5 concerns itself solely with our relation, in so far as our intellect can distinguish between them, to Substance qua substances or Monad qua substances. Fundamentally, Substance and Monad are the same concept; whereas one Substance constitutes Spinoza’s metaphysical outlook, infinitely many Monads (Substances) constitute Leibniz’s metaphysical outlook.
3.1 It seems apparent that the difference between Substance Monism and Monadology is essentially epistemological. That is, regardless of their inconsistent truth values, can we ever know the conclusions of the doctrines per se or even distinguish between them?