A weedy florilegium

As a meta-ethical theory, moral relativism is the broadest ethical line of thought which attacks the notion that concepts such as “good” and “bad” are deducible truths which bear some unified point in the logical form or physical structure of the world. That these concepts are truths at all, for the meta-ethicist, is determined by circumstances; the contexts in which these concepts arise are forceful and persuasive nowhere else except in the context in which they are used. Any use of a “good” concept outside of its original context is done so by analogical reasoning or weak relational argument. “Weak” in that, for the meta-ethicist, these concepts never correspond absolutely to any other concepts, presumably, outside of their original context.

As a normative theory, moral relativism usually holds that tolerance of moral norms is the best way to go about addressing moral disagreements, supposing that there are any true moral disagreements. A moral relativist would have you see the norms and their origins first before you address the moral proposition being given. In addressing the history of moral norms the moral relativist seeks to show that the norms, which presumably necessitate the moral position of any speaker, can be show to be harmonious with ostensibly contrary norms; in effect, no serious (or essential) moral disagreement arises. Norms of a culture, as the moral relativist wishes to show, can be harmonized; this pertains to presumably “extreme moral situations.” For most other situations, and inevitably done arbitrarily so, the moral relativist must show that engrossing moral situations are not, in fact, “morally imbued. And thus, the situation is not, as will be typically argued, in need of “moral tolerance.” For the normative moral relativist, it will be a serious matter of anthropological description rather than, as I am in custom of believing, ethical analysis.

Moral absolutism is an ontological argument for the existence of moral concepts being this way or that way within the moral sphere, supposing there is a moral sphere in which the concepts used correspond to the web of causal interaction. That is, what must be supposed is that our minds are epistemically capable of understanding the true value of those concepts used, rather than just some mere human (contrived) value. Moral absolutists of a humanist bent may be wont to assert that a human value is an essential value. The moral absolutist wishes to show that by the nature of the concepts used, what necessarily follows are ought-claims. It is a grand attempt at showing how an amalgamation of values, which presumably all people hold, can be jammed into one concept.

The normative moral absolutist will argue that singular concepts entail a finite number of other concepts not of the founding concept’s exact nature. That is, “goodness entails happiness.” “Goodness” is seen as an ontologically isolated notion which makes it possible for “happiness” to exist. Concepts similar to it, those such as justice and virtuousness, share the same fate in ontology of ethics. That is why so many philosophers of the past quibble furiously over how “goodness” can fit into a society. Alas, in sowing resolutely their distress, goodness thrives independent of “happiness”; in effect, “goodness” becomes a necessary condition for happiness, but, as my tone implies, is never sufficient. What’s important to notice here is that I have been dealing with concepts themselves, free of context. The point is, a moral absolutist feels that, as said, moral reasoning can be done through ontological argument, the study of the “inherent” nature of the ideas being used. The notion of context is but a trivial one, seemingly undermined by the assertion that a particular form of “goodness” better explains the grand scheme of things.

A further assumption of the moral absolutist is that we are not semantically closed off from these concepts. That is, we have some relative or absolute understanding that these concepts are in themselves meaningful. So you can have a Semantically Relative Moral Absolutist, etc, etc.

The relativist wants to look at context first. What is typically argued is for a special status to be given to “context,” given the presupposition that context dictates how we can even treat a moral problem at all. Further, epistemically, it is appealing to accept the governance of local contextual moral problems because our minds are finite. A moral relativist might argue that we cannot conceive the “essence of the Good” clearly and distinctly, as the Cartesians would say, any more than we can conceive God clearly and distinctly. Addressing the issue of God, regardless of cultural view on “God” (be it Brahmin, Buddha, Yahweh, etc), is important in that it helps one better understand how the absolutist preconceives certain concepts which she argues for. Further, and it is very often the case, the predisposition to moral absolutism follows from a religious background.

What’s really at issue in this case, but this is just an immature theory, is that religious communities pass down a psychological conviction that brews a sort of myopia for its inhabitants. That myopia, as the relativist may argue initially along with me, is with respect to seeing the importance of local contexts as the leading determinant to making intelligible to the human mind those presumably true moral dilemmas.

Let us consider something; now let us!–
Not find a few forgottens in locations
Latent by locutions

Can I trouble you for a meaning? O can I!
Confuse the ostentatious displacement
For what it is, that you said–

What is that that which is? It is which, then
Puzzling to what was interpreted

Down a dismal corridor of
Petty metaphors drowning
Therein barrels of rainwater

The song of their quiet
And heavy beauty condemns
Each notion clear and distinct

We are tramps, paying
Ourselves for a drab service
Enabled by our weathered words

I will relate myself to a word
And I will find myself coerced
Wherein language can I find you?

1 There are compounds.
2 Compounds are aggregates of simples.
3 If there are aggregates of simples, then there are simples.
4 There being compounds presupposes that there are simples which constitute those compounds (hidden premise).
5 Therefore, there are simples.

How do we challenge the presupposition? In what ways do simples correspond to compounds? The argument is highly analogical; in fact, it can only be shown by analogy. If the contents of the analogy are themselves composed of simples, does not the mere use of analogy presuppose the truth of the argument for simples? In fact, the analogy commits itself to circularity. Can we separate the argument for simples from analogy (with respect to concrete objects)? Must we think in terms of ideas or concepts proper in order to establish the notion of simples? What does it mean for a “concept” to be composed of an aggregate of “simples” or simpler concepts? What would be the content of a concept? Does it have sense for us to say that a concept is “composed” of anything? That is, can we say that a concept has parts? What would qualify as a part of a concept? That to which it refers (i.e., its concrete objects)? To what does the notion of “compound” apply or refer? “Compound” is composed of letters (simples), but the word itself does not establish that there are letters, only that letters are used in a certain way. Outside of their word-context, their existence is not established. The assertion must be that the world itself is a compound of simples; however, in what sense does justification of the world equally justify its own parts insofar as their ontological status as compounded.

I fall to pieces
each time I see you.
You want me to forget,
to pretend–

But I try;
I haven’t yet
’cause you walked by;
I fall to pieces.

You want me to forget,
to pretend we never met.
You want me to f–
you want me to forget!
You want me to forget!

You want me to f…?
To pretend we never–
you want me to forget;
pretend we never met.

You want me to forget!
You want me to forget.
You–
You want me to forget!

Arguin’ with a person on a forum.

Yes – this is in effect saying that the truth of (1a) entails the truth of (1b). What you call an existentially generalized proposition I call an ambiguous proposition.

You might call it this, but nevertheless, the proposition is true, justified, and could be believed by Smith or anyone he might pass that proposition (1b) to. Your argument that it is ambiguous is noteworthy, but it’s about as noteworthy as regards JTB as statistics data with marginalization errors.

Existential Introduction uses a particular to generalize. It is a valid form of reasoning by most modern logicians’ standards. (Pa -> ExPx)

This is the inference Smith makes. It is a logically valid inference. This is all Gettier wants you to look at, that of being logically valid. Thus, it becomes a Justified True Logical Inference. Gettier wants you to believe
(a) that it is possible for Smith to believe it,
(B) that if Smith were to believe it, it would be a kosher belief, and
(c) that truth-functionality makes, in this case and in many cases of our lives, semantic content irrelevant (even though semantic content is there–this is your ambiguity argument).

Ultimately, your “ambiguity argument” translates into our need to look at the semantic content of any proposition. However, upon analysis, there’s no reason to see why a proposition cannot both (a) have semantic content and (b) have truth-functional parameters which condition its truth or falsity.

Gettier wants us to look at (b), as I’ve said numerous times already, and ignore, for the moment, (a). I do not need to be told anymore the notion of “puns.” I get the notion of ambiguity. I hope now that I have laid out (a) and (b), the argument will not be reiterated that the proposition (1b) is “ambiguous” or a “pun.” That much has been understood for sometime now.

What is not “ambiguous” is the jump from particular (Jones) to generalized (man). Your beef with ambiguity does not come from seeing that Smith made the inference. Your beef comes from the possibility of what Smith could have meant (semantic content, pun, etc). He, ultimately, had to have been something. Gettier would like you to look at only the truth-functionality of the situation; that is,

(a) Smith believes “The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket” in strictly truth-functional terms with respect to the properties so stated (that of “man-ness,” “getting the job,” and “coin possession.”

We have trouble with this because we know and feel that Smith must have someone in mind. Keith Donellan’s attributive-referential distinction gives us a clear view of the problem here. Gettier wants us to look at the proposition in the attributive sense. He wants us to see Smith has making a proposition in which some such man will be attributed with the properties of “getting the job” and “coin possession.”

Our problem is with the referential sense that Smith does not satisfy. Smith, with your (1b), could not be referring to any man. However, by Existential Instantiation, when people make propositions of the sort (1b), we expect them to have a referent in mind.

So we can look at the proposition as attributive or as referential. What are the criteria for saying that we ought to look at it in one sense rather than the other? In short, Why should we even care about ambiguity (which pertains to reference) when Smith is talking about the attributive sense? And if your argument is “Gettier didn’t mean that,” then I am interpreting at the moment that he did. So, I’d like to understand how my interpretation is wrong.

Now, Existential Instantiation/Elimination is trickier. (ExPx -> Pa) And it pertains to our problem of the attributive sense. We consider this a valid line of reasoning. Given the context of the situation, look at it this way:

Smith is asked by the secretary, just on a whim of hers, “Who do you think will get the job?” Smith says, “The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.” For whatever reason, this secretary also knows that Jones has ten coins in his pocket, and, let us further suppose that she does have evidence of this property of coin possession that pertaining to Smith. She cheerfully smiles in response, and the office becomes silent.

Now we are faced with the problem you guys raise; and this is the problem in its most proper sense. Between Smith and Jones, this secretary cannot use existential instantiation to infer the right man who bears ten coins and who will get the job. She has equal evidence for both; what is not conveyed to her is Smith’s evidence for Jones getting the job; this information, which is vital, is not captured in the proposition. This is the nature of generalizations; we all know this. Most Asians become “math nerds”; most blacks become “basketball stars”; etc, etc. But it is quite different in this case: for the secretary, the proposition is not ambiguous insofar as the properties go. For her, she can only look at the properties of coin possession and getting the job. Being a man is by default true because they are both men. For her, she is tying “coin possession” and “job getting” together.

Consider “men” as the universe of discourse. Now, being a man is just assumed. But we’ve gone to far, your arguments are with the meaning Smith had. I’ve already raised my argument: We must reconcile “truth-functionality” with “semantic content.” You might say “Gettier ignores semantic content,” but so what? You are ignoring truth-functionality.

Are they mutually exclusive?

You say “Gettier would love this to be the case…” Where is your justification for saying that Gettier is wrong about investigating these propositions only in terms of truth-functionality?