Categorical Imperative as Epistemic Modal
“Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”
Gloss: Let us look at what concerns an immediate failure of the first formulation of the categorical imperative. First, we concern ourselves with the pre-theoretical, namely, the conditions which might precede the application of such an intellectual tool. Our general concern is the presupposition of a morally closed universe of discourse. More specifically, in which domains ought we apply the categorical imperative? Kant gives us examples of “lying” and “murder” and “giving into providing information to a murderer.” What is it that is presupposed in these situations? Lying is assumed to be a terrible thing which needs justification. Why would we ever assume such an “inherent” as that which is in the lie. The lie supervenes on the circumstance: Will we judge, from theoretical standpoint, lies as such or lies as manifest (acquiring a nature subsequent to) from the circumstances in which one’s act was involved? Kant demands that we ignore the consequences in a material sense but utilize consequence, nevertheless, as a theoretico-methodological tool. In perceiving ourselves as being affected by consequence in this method, we find ourselves exploiting ourselves as a means to some end. The subject must conceive of a world in which the subject is erased, subsumed under some manifest ontology, so that the imperative make properly take place in the projected theory.
Why might I not choose “stepping on beetles” or “slamming the door”? If I choose to apply the imperative to the mundane, which very well might transfer into severe moral issues, I could at the same time convert myself into something inert. Naturally, in accepting the imperative, I must enter a theoretical point with a background of moral leanings. But will this background properly yield a contradiction or simply given me vacillation of mind? The violence done to one’s intellect is what I experience. I can imagine no further when I conceive the world, as best I can, through the filter of the imperative. In taking the steps of playing our this theoretical world to its contradictory end when and where along this path might I halt satisfied with that contradiction I strove to derive? Which acts, if any, fall under the imperative’s purview? Perusal of all action gives us nothing useful, gives us absurdity. Some action, thus, is our target. But which action? Why must we investigate only certain kinds of lies? It seems that if we have a specific lie, a specific kind of lie, we have analytically derived a contradiction. But presumably analytic statements have nothing to do with this world. If true, I might as well consider “2+2=4″ as the guiding principle for how I might educate my children, testify in court, and so on. But clearly this, too, is an absurd foundation for one’s moral principles.
“…whereby you can will…” grounds us, I believe, in the modal. Is it possible at all to apply the imperative? Might our epistemic limit preclude us in all cases from doing so? I do not harp on the consequences whereby we might judge our imperative’s success. But I raise issue with it being conceivable at all that any one of us might indeed employ it. It seems better to modify the formulation as “… whereby you might wish…” Kant presumes the human capacity to employ it where I perceive the human desire to employ it, and not in all cases but only some. Kant’s formulation strikes me as pitting the will against the intellect, but Spinoza informs me that they are one and the same, one does not stretch beyond the other. But in desiring to extend one’s will one has only chosen at some point to do so. The issue of intellect falls through the cracks, and we take stance in assuming the background of our application of the imperative, perhaps of any moral decision, as absurd.