Quasi-set theoretic approach to the N. Fallacy
The term “good” lacks natural properties. Agent A cannot be said to necessarily predicate of conjoined properties {X, Y, Z} as set that it is “good.” In some cases, we may find {X, Z}, and A may only believe {X, Y, Z} are present. The X and Z may in fact cause Y to manifest in some cases, whereas in other cases they may not. Thus, A may use “good” to predicate of the set when that set does not bear its usual constituent properties. Will the application of “good” even occur under these conditions so set? Can we imagine our agent never being deceived or being overly presumptive perhaps? What if we suggest all the properties consisting the set are eliminated so that we must conceive of A as “conceiving in isolation” the set or collection. Will we say the idea of the set is “good” or the natural manifestation of it must be “good”? Is there truly a conflict between good-as-type and good-as-token? Do types have natural properties by which we might predicate of them with “goodness”?