Noncognitivists against the first blush (Infantile thoughts)
Premise: Statements uttered bear propositional content.
Contraposition: Non-propositional content is not contained within a statement.
A statement on paper, as example, say, has no attitudinal content, but does bear a propositional content. This will be its “literal” or “isolated” content; thus, we rightly label its status as such.
(C)ats have four legs; (C) has literal content. (F)isk believes (C); (F) has attitudinal content. A belief alone requires no justification for it, however, it will possess as (F)-type, a collection of contingent world-fixing components that give it life, viability as a sincere belief. A belief with no world-fixing component is typically considered as vacuous. Thus, (S)usan believes (G)od exists is considered a vacuous belief by the atheist who holds as premise (G’)od is not attached or related to the world. Naturally, the next step is to discuss the constitution (physical or otherwise) of the world. But that discussion will not fall under my purpose here.
Knowledge, as is commonly held, counts when a subject, or agent, is related to a belief, just so described, a true fact and a justification (not as merely “reason for” in the way that the belief came about). The agent must be related in the “appropriate way.” Suggesting the causally appropriate way as the means by which a person comes to a belief leaves us wanting for the “justification,” when we see that belief as “odd” or unintuitive or false. If X acknowledges the belief of Y only insofar as X adheres to the causal appropriation thesis, X may still be left to, or find herself wishing to, inquire as to its justification. We must ask, then, what is the relation between the causal story of the belief’s manifestation and the justification so given for that belief. This may come before or after determining that belief’s truth-value. Thus, we have a triple relation between the causal story, the truth-value, and the justification. The truth-value’s determination is grounded in the truth-conditions for that statement’s being possibly justified. Here we see the connection between justification and truth-value. A justification accounts for the truth-conditions for a statement being true. Further, we might be inclined to say that a statement bearing no truth-conditions at all cannot possibly, or necessarily does not, become the constituent of a attitudinal context. Thus, a subject cannot possibly, or necessarily does not, entertain the statement.
Looks may be deceiving: it certainly looks as if the statement is being entertained. We will say, “Ah, look. This man is flailing about and uttering just like the college professor does. Of course his utterances bear a (propositional) content.” But surely this cannot be the sole justification for such a view. It is patently an absurd premise, for it assumes a condition of “rationality as producing rational behavior.” If we look at “rational behavior,” we can infer rational entertainment of a propositional content. But this assumes exactly that which is contested, namely that content of all sort is rational. We are taken off course to look at rational behavior rather than the target set before us.