A weedy florilegium

By ab esse ad posse valet illatio:

1. If [God exists] and [Evil exists] are both true, then it is possible that [G] and [E] are both true.
2. If [God exists (and) Evil exists] is true, then it is possible that [G (and) E] is true.
3. If [G (and) E] is true, then [G] is true.
4. If [G (and) E] is true, then [E] is true.
5. If [G (and) E] is true, then it is possible that [G] is true.
6. If [G (and) E] is true, then it is possible that [E] is true.

If [God exists] is true, then [G] is internally logically consistent.
[God exists] implies [It is not the case that God does not exist]. // Two logically consistent statements.
Depending on the definition of “God,” such that “X could not create evil” and “X created all things” [God exists] implies [That which created all things and that which could not create evil exists]. // This statement cannot be a record of a fact, as its precludes the modal statement undermines the true of the action picked out by the verb; and the action picked out by the verb implies the negation of the modal statement. The statement is prima facie nonsense (internally logically inconsistent), since it implies that a undescribed entity exists. So far as objects and their descriptions go, to assert that an unrecognized or unidentified or undescribed object exists on basis of a finite set of predicates is to say something similar to “At least one I-don’t-know-what exists”; and this is manifestly true, as many things outside of one’s experience do exist, but which cannot be described, or could not at the time of the utterance be described. Thus, one invokes the set of unknown entities, and asserts that at least one exists; and so the question is: Must we only assert the existence of just those identifies which we have descriptions for? Well, this question is quite general, and we must come to understand what we mean by “have descriptions for.” Naturally this segues into a question about Russellian descriptions. Certainly “the round-square is orange” counts as a grammatical description, and Russell more than less provided to us a philosophical method for distinguishing grammatical and existential descriptions. “The $@#%@##$ is under the ~@~” would fail under both perspectives, and for different reasons. But the philosophical question is: Will we find an intersection between the set of those independent concerns (e.g., picture theory of language).

If “A” is true, then “A” is possible. But if “A” is ungrammatical but true, then is “A” still possible? I s’pose the obvious answer is “yes.” But I am in search of an intersection between true statements and grammatical ones: Are linguistic predicates grounded by true states of affairs? I wish to understand the response “That’s because you ground all of your predicates in a materialist framework, which is not tenable” to the assertion “You’ve defined ‘God’ in a logically inconsistent way.”

1. “The $@#%@##$ is under the ~@~” if, and only if, The $@#%@##$ is under the ~@.
   1. If “The $@#%@##$ is under the ~@~” is true, then The $@#%@##$ is under the ~@~.
   2. If The $@#%@##$ is under the ~@~ is true, then “The $@#%@##$ is under the ~@~.”

If “The $@#%@##$ is under the ~@~” is true, then my sufficient explanation as to its truth does not make it true. It is true whether it records a fact about the world; how the world is makes it true. This is why its truth, if it is true, would imply its possibility: under this world, such a state of affairs is possible. And the statement, or proposition, records that state of affairs. Yet, it is clearly ungrammatical: but its “surface grammar” is no indication of its existential directedness: what it points to. But why are we led to believe that grammatical statements tend more so to truth than ungrammatical ones? Well, my hunch is that we in fact don’t, and we are, for the most part, consciously concerned with truth, or desire truth, whereas the possibility of truth lies in a kind of grammar. Of course, this is an old hat. One cannot make heads or tails of the statement “The $@#%@##$ is under the ~@~”; and so its truth is out of the question. Now we might ask: what is implied by its truth? With this question we may have hope toward understanding its meaning.